OpenClaw unauthenticated discovery TXT records could steer routing and TLS pinning
Discovery beacons in OpenClaw include unauthenticated TXT records that iOS and macOS clients used as authoritative inputs for routing and connection, while iOS and Android clients allowed discovery-provided TLS fingerprints to override stored pins. An attacker on a shared LAN could advertise a rogue service to intercept connections and credentials.
What happened
Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) in OpenClaw include TXT records such as lanHost, tailnetDns, gatewayPort, and gatewayTlsSha256 that are unauthenticated.
iOS and macOS clients treated TXT-provided host hints and ports as authoritative routing inputs to build connection URLs. iOS and Android clients allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint to override previously stored TLS pins.
An attacker on a shared or untrusted LAN could advertise a rogue _openclaw-gw._tcp service to cause clients to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint or accept an attacker certificate.
Reported impact
The attack could potentially allow exfiltration of Gateway credentials (auth.token / auth.password) during connection to the attacker-controlled endpoint.
The iOS and Android apps are currently alpha and not broadly shipped, so practical impact is primarily limited to developers and testers running those builds and any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared or untrusted LAN.
Index analysis
The vulnerability is classified as CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data.
Governance controls
Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints, and discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.
iOS and Android require first-time TLS pins to have explicit user confirmation with the fingerprint displayed, and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. Android hostname verification is no longer globally disabled and is only bypassed when pinning.
Classification
Sources and evidence
This record was researched and written by the Index, based on the following original reporting.