OpenClaw SSRF guard bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals
OpenClaw's SSRF protection had a vulnerability that allowed bypass via full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation, enabling requests to loopback and private network addresses that should have been blocked. The vulnerability was reported by yueyueL and patched in version 2026.2.14.
What happened
OpenClaw's SSRF protection could be bypassed using full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals such as 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:7f00:1, which represents the loopback address 127.0.0.1.
The SSRF guard's IP classification did not consistently detect private IPv4 addresses when embedded in IPv6 using full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation, allowing requests that should be blocked to pass the guard.
Reported impact
Requests to loopback, private network, and link-local metadata addresses could bypass the SSRF guard and be processed when they should have been blocked.
Index analysis
The vulnerability is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) protection bypass caused by inconsistent IP address classification in the SSRF guard component (src/infra/net/ssrf.ts).
Governance controls
The vulnerability was patched in version 2026.2.14 with improved IP classification to block full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals.
Classification
Sources and evidence
This record was researched and written by the Index, based on the following original reporting.